Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America

In nuance state of war? The Myth of a Polarized America,1 Morris Fiorina takes aim at the contention that on that point is a culture war in America, that our society is badly divided and polarized so that we ar rapidly falling into two competing camps ready to do fighting with one an otherwise. It is a bold arguwork forcet.The conceit that a culture war is raging in America is a staple of certain media outlets, curiously AM talk radio, where the likes of Michael Savage, Bill OReilly, and Rush Limbaugh on the right, and Thom Hartman, Randi Rhodes, and Al Franken of left-leaning Air America constantly sound alarms, crying that whichever barbarians they dread are about to storm the temple. Against this popular belief, Morris Fiorina has impressive credentials he taught at for ten years at CalTech, for viteen years at Harvard, and he is now a senior fellow at the Hoover base and holds an endowed chair in political science at Stanford University.Using in advance(p) sampling d ata, Fiorina shows that the American public holds a range of diverse opinions, that if finds that instead of being increasingly polarized, the American public has generally been pitiful to the center of the political spectrum on many issues. Consider an issue which he admits is a hot button item homosexuality. Fiorina finds that the American public has bit by bit but steadily become much accepting of homosexuals over the early(prenominal) 30 years.True enough, the public does not accept homosexual marriage, nor did they accept col the military to gays, but these are not the entire question of homosexuality. On the issue of being willing to accept homosexuals in general, the public place has shown increasing moderation. To establish this, Fiorina chooses polls in which the sample group was asked to say homosexuals on a thermometerscale, in which 100 is radical bankers acceptance, and 0 is total rejection. In 1984, homosexuals earned a 0 score from 30 share of Americans.By 2000, the percentageage of 0 scores has dropped to just 10 percent, and the overall acceptance rating for homosexuals has risen from 30 percent to 49 percent. (84) While these ratings do not show that homosexuals com handsce managed to escape the stigma below which they have been compelled to live, they show that the shocking divide in which the issue is often visualised does not exist. Similarly, the abortion issue, long considered the most divisive of social issues, is unimpeachably less divisive than it is pictured in popular media.A clear bulk of Americans now support the basic decision in Roe v. Wade, the 1973 dogmatic Court abortion case. More than 65 percent of Americans support a strong right to choose. (54) Further, attitudes as to when abortion should be pass oned are nigh un deviated since 1973. As of 1999, the last year for which Fiorina has data, 88 percent of Americans regard that abortion should be allowed if the life or health of the pregnant charwoman was severely endangered. (55) In 1973, the number was 87 percent.If, like Fiorina, we accept the norm that a change of four percent or less in a survey of this type is not statistically significant, then the just factor about which the surveys have asked which has seen a statistically significant change is the right to a woman to have an abortion based on a claim that she has an income so low that she cannot afford another child. even up in this situation, some 40 percent of the general population would allow the abortion. (55) The change in attitudes, such as it is, is in the percentage of Americans who accept that all abortion is murder.While this saw a slight rebound in the late 1990s, it has fallen from 22 percent in 1973 to 18 percent, and since Roe, it has never been above 25 percent. (71) Another remarkable finding that Fiorina uncovered is that men and women have virtually identical attitudes on abortion, even though they differ markedly in their views on other issues. (7 1-72) The percentage of men and women who reckon that abortion should be legal under all circumstances has vary between 21 and 36 percent for women, and between 20 and 30 percent for men, with the dissimilarity between sexes never being more than six percent.The percentage of men and women believing that abortion should be illegal under all circumstances has run between 15 and 23 percent for women and between 13 and 21 percent for men, with never more than a difference of four percent. (71) By contrast on other issues, the difference between mens and womens attitude is far more marked. Responding to the suggestion that all handguns except those carried by police or other persons in authority should be illegal, only 28 percent of men agree 48 percent of women agree.Regarding the caning of an American teenage arrested in Singapore for acts of vandalism, 61 percent of men approved of the punishment only 39 percent of women approved. While 43 percent of men consider themselves conser vative, only 29 percent of women do. (72) In short, while abortion does not appear to be as divisive an issue as it is portrayed, there are other issues on which there is division. Fiorina presents a sweeping ramble of data, all of which shows far less division than is generally assume to exist.This raises a natural question if there are fewer deep divisions than Americans imagine, why do Americans believe that there are such division? Fiorina points to several(prenominal) sources, including political parties, media, and pundits. Media and pundits want to portray conflict, because conflict sells. (115-23) As the quip goes, If it bleeds, it leads. To collide with his conclusions, Fiorina has to delve into sophisticated statistical models.The reader wishing to follow his melodic line in detail faces a daunting task, because Fiorina uses three dimensional statistical models ass he works through assumptions about voter and medical prognosis behavior. (118-24) In the end, Fiorina a rgues that it is not the general populace that is divided, but the elites, the people who are active in party work. (125-31) In their turn, the elites are the most genial to and the most accessing of the media and the pundits. (141-42) Party elite organizations tend to be strongly self-selecting.Only a true believer among republicans can rise far through the Republican party organization only a true believing populist gets to the top of the Democratic party. Once in the elite, these people tend to call for equal zeal from anyone else wanting admission, and to select people with the same ideals to plug into the elites. The result is set of self-perpetuating cadres of zealots, who believe, or at least would like to believe that they stand on the ramparts and fight for the Lord. In Fiorina convincing? He would in all probability find a certain irony in the response maybe.Any serious reader must give pause. There is comfort in the idea is that we are not becoming constantly more pol arized. Still we are conditioned to believe we are polarized. That idea appears so often that a refutation is hard to accept. But anyone who reads this book will probably suppose if Fiorina is right or not. He would probably approve of that response. AUTHORITY CITED Fiorina, Morris, with Samuel Abrams and Jeremy Pope. Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized Amierca. New York, New York Pearson/Longman, 2005.